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Abstract
In this article, the possible privacy and security threats to the radio frequency identification (RFID) systems are
investigated and new authentication protocols are proposed which provide the identified privacy and security in a
very efficient manner for a ubiquitous computing environment. The approach utilizes the concepts of two very
different, widely known RFID protocols, i.e. the “low-cost authentication protocol (LCAP)” approach and the “one-
way hash-based LCAP “ approach. The resulting protocols combine the advantages of both protocols and
eliminate the problems from these. The approaches are evaluated using a variety of criteria that are relevant in
practice. The proposed protocols use random numbers and a hash function to encrypt the key to protect the RFID
system from the adversary attacks. The hash value is used as a hash address to reduce the search time to locate
the tag in the database from a large number of records. A simulation experiment is conducted to verify some of
the privacy and security properties of the proposed protocols.
Keywords: RFID, security, authentication protocol, ubiquitous, hash address
1. Introduction
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags emerge as the
successor of barcodes and are used in many applications
such as in automation of automobiles, animal tracking,
highway toll collection and supply-chain management
[1]. An RFID tag has some advantages over an optical
barcode that makes it more suitable in automation. A
barcode indicates the type of the object on which it is
printed but the RFID tag gives a unique serial number
that distinguishes the object uniquely from many millions
of similar types of products. Another advantage of an
RFID tag is that it does not require line-of-sight contact
with the readers as in optical barcodes. RFID is a technol-
ogy to identify objects or people automatically [2]. An
RFID system consists of three components: tag, reader
and back-end database [3]. It is a small and extremely
low-priced device consists of a microchip with very lim-
ited functionality and data storage and an antenna for
wireless communication with readers. An RFID tag can
be passive or active depending on the powering techni-
que. In general, passive tags are inexpensive. They have
no on-board power; they get power from the signal of the
interrogating reader. Active tags contain batteries to
power their transmission. RFID readers with antennas
are devices used to read or write data from or to the
RFID tags. The readers send query to a tag to obtain
information from the tag. The database stores the infor-
mation about the tags and the readers [4].
The RFID tag in the form of electronic product code
(EPC) tag is the most popular standard and is specified by
an organization called EPCglobal Inc. [5]. An EPC tag tra-
ditionally contains some information such as a product
type identifier, a manufacturer identifier and a unique
serial number those are exposed to the reader. This
unique serial number works as a unique identifier (ID).
Due to this unique serial number in an RFID tag, it is pos-
sible to track the tag uniquely. Due to this, the information
in an RFID system is vulnerable to unauthorized readers.
An RFID system is vulnerable to various attacks such as
eavesdropping, traffic analysis, spoofing and denial of ser-
vice. These attacks may reveal sensitive information of
tags and hence break a person’s privacy. Another type of
privacy violation is traceability which establishes a relation
between a person and a tag. If a link can be established
between a person and the tag, the tracing of the tag makes
the tracing of the person possible [1]. To protect the priv-
acy in an RFID system, a tag needs to authenticate a
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reader. However, it is infeasible to use conventional cryp-
tography in a passive RFID tag due to its extremely limited
processing and memory limitations. A typical RFID system
is shown in Figure 1.
The objective of the article is to propose new efficient
and effective protocols to address these issues for RFID
systems in ubiquitous computing environment. The proto-
cols are based on the challenge-response method using a
one-way hash function, a static identifier and two random
numbers in the RFID systems. The purpose of the hash
function is to give a one-way hash result so that an adver-
sary cannot extract the input from the output. The value
of the hash function is also used as a hash address for the
tags in the database. The purpose of the random numbers
is to make the response anonymous. This protocol pro-
tects the privacy and security of RFID systems of the issues
outlined above.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section
2, the privacy and security model in RFID system is dis-
cussed. Also the performance criteria of the RFID systems
are discussed in this section. Section 3 contains the related
studies. In Section 4, contributions and protocols are pre-
sented. Section 5 outlined the privacy, security and effi-
ciency analysis for evaluation of our protocols. Section 6
describes the simulation result and evaluation. Section 7
concludes the article citing major contributions.
2. Privacy and security in RFID systems
The privacy and security objective in RFID system is to
protect the communication between the reader and the
tag from various attacks. We identify the following priv-
acy and security issues:
• Information leakage: In a typical RFID system, a
tag has a unique identifier that is transmitted to the
reader. So it can easily be identified with this unique
serial number. Due to this unique serial number, the
information in it is vulnerable to an adversary. For the
protection from information leakage, an RFID system
needs to provide privacy control so that unauthorized
readers cannot access the tags.
• Traceability and location privacy: If the response
of a tag can be linked to the tag then the location of
the tag can be tracked. If a tag transmits a static
response to a reader, an adversary can distinguish it
from other responses. If the responses from the tags
are anonymous, then the tracking problem can be
avoided.
• Impersonation and replay attack: An adversary can
query to a tag or a reader and can impersonate the tag
or the reader. If an adversary can collect the information
during communication from the tag and the reader they
can impersonate the tag to explore more information.
An adversary can use this information and replay in the
future.
• Denial of service (DoS): An adversary may disrupt
the communication between a valid reader and a tag. If
the adversary can successfully block the transmission it
can cause the server and the tag to lose synchronization.
The RFID system should be able to handle this to keep
the synchronization of the tag and the reader.
Figure 1 A typical RFID system.
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3. Related studies
There are many approaches for the privacy and security
of the RFID systems. Sharma et al. [6] mentioned about
the resource constrained in an RFID tag as a main chal-
lenge to provide privacy and security. The first approach
towards the privacy and security of an RFID tag is to kill
[7] the tag at the point of sale. Due to various reasons for
which killing a tag is not expected because consumer
may wish to reuse the tag. Weis et el. [8] proposed a
hash-based access control (HAC) approach to protect a
tag using a one-way hash function. To do it, the tag
stores the hash of a random key as a metaID. Since the
metaID is same for a tag all the times, it always transmits
the same metaID, which can easily be tracked by an
adversary [9]. Another problem in this system is that the
information is transmitted in plain text which can easily
be eavesdropped. Weis et al. [8] also suggested another
approach that is extended from HAC called randomized
access control [8]. It uses a random number to prevent
location privacy. In each session, the tag produces a
response with newly generated random number and its
ID using a hash function. It cannot protect the system
from replay attack and is not suitable in a real-life system
where a large number of tags are used as it requires
many expensive hash operations at the back-end
database.
To protect location privacy several protocols use hash
function of varied identifier or varied secret [9-13]. Chien
and Chen [9] proposed a challenge-response-based
authentication protocol to prevent replay attack. This pro-
tocol uses a database in the server which maintains new
and old tag keys to protect DoS attack. To prevent trace-
ability, authentication and access keys are updated. How-
ever, this scheme is still vulnerable to backward and
forward traceability because if an active attacker compro-
mise a tag this can identify the tag’s past interactions from
previous transactions and the fixed ID of the tag and can
deduce the future transaction. Ohkubo et al. [10] proposed
an RFID privacy scheme using a hash chain (HC) mechan-
ism. This method uses two hash functions to protect the
privacy and security. It is also not suitable in practical use
because the back-end database requires a large number of
HCs. Henrici et al. [11] proposed a scheme referred to the
hash-based ID variation scheme (HIDV). It uses a one-way
hash function to protect location privacy by changing the
ID after each session. However, if any authentication
session is unsuccessful it replies with the same hashed ID
again for which it opens up the vulnerability for imperso-
nation attack such as spoofing. Lee et al. [12] proposed a
low-cost authentication protocol (LCAP) which simplifies
and enhances HIDV scheme in both efficiency and secur-
ity. It has the similar problem as in HIDV that a tag always
replies with the same hashed ID before the next successful
authentication which allows tag tracking. Dimitriou [13]
proposed an RFID authentication scheme that preserves
user privacy and also protects against tag cloning. This
protocol uses the hash of its identifier as a response to a
reader query to maintain scalability at the server, and the
back-end server sends a message using the updated identi-
fier to the tag after getting the tag response. This scheme
also has a problem of tracking as between valid sessions
the tag identifier remains the same.
Varying identifier may cause problem in ubiquitous
computing environment. To solve the problem, static
identifiers are used in many authentication protocols.
Molnar et al. [14] proposed a private authentication
scheme for library RFID systems. It uses a pseudorandom
number and a shared secret key by the tag and the reader
for efficient authentication. This scheme does not ensure
forward security since the tag’s identifier and the secret
key are static and the random number forwarded is in
plain text which can be captured by an adversary. Rhee et
al. [15] proposed challenge response-based RFID authen-
tication protocol (CRAP) which is designed to use in ubi-
quitous computing. However, this scheme requires (N/2
+1) hash function computations in the database which is
impractical for large number of tags in ubiquitous com-
puting. Choi et al. [16] proposed a one-way hash-based
LCAP (OHLCAP), which is suitable for ubiquitous envir-
onment. Ha et al. [17] claim that OHLCAP suffers from
traceability and impersonation attack. The authors also
proposed a solution of using hash function to protect
from traceability attack. Tsudik [18] described an RFID
identification protocol that provides a basic level of tag
identification using time-stamps. Tsudik [18] also pro-
posed two further schemes that provide tag authentica-
tion. The schemes use monotonically increasing time-
stamps for tracking-resistant tag authentication, and
employ a keyed hash function f.
Karthikeyan and Nesterenko [19] proposed RFID
security protocol without computationally expensive
cryptographic mechanisms and used simple matrix multi-
plication. However, this protocol is vulnerable to DoS
attack and intruder can try a brute-force matrix and key
guessing attack. Moreover, this scheme is not secure
from replay and tracking attack. Song and Mitchell (SM)
[20] proposed an RFID authentication protocol and own-
ership transfer protocol [21] to prevent all the attacks
discussed so far. Although these protocols are efficient in
terms of storage and computation requirements, but they
are vulnerable to both tag impersonation attack and
reader impersonation attack. Cai et al. [22] proposed a
revised authentication protocol of SM [20] to eliminate
the problems in it without violation of any other security
properties. The storage and computation requirements
are also comparable with the existing protocol.
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In the next two sections, two prominent protocols
LCAP [12] and OHLCAP [16] will be discussed in more
detail as they are more related to the proposed work.
3.1 LCAP approach
LCAP scheme uses one-way hash function to protect
the privacy and security of the tag. The notations and
symbols used in LCAP operation are as follows [12]:
h: {0, 1}* ® {0, 1}l is a one-way hash function
ID: ID denotes identity of a tag and is a random value
in {0, 1}l.
Data fields of a tag and a reader are initialized to the
following values:
Tag: The data field of a tag is initialized to its own ID.
Reader: A reader picks uniformly a random number r
in {0, 1}l.
The data fields of a back-end database are initialized
to HaID, ID, TD and DATA.
HaID: HaID value is the hash value of ID used for
identifying or addressing the tag.
TD: TD-entry is used to trace previous data informa-
tion of a tag when loss of message occurs in the current
session.
DATA: DATA stores the information about an accessi-
ble tag.
The back-end database maintains two rows; Prev for
the previous session and Curr for the current session.
Each row contains HaID, ID, TD, and DATA fields. In
Prev, the back-end database records HaID and ID in the
previous session. In Curr, it updates HaID and ID of
Prev. TD-field of Curr has HaID value of Prev and TD-
field of Prev contains HaID-value of Curr. The protocol
is shown in Figure 2.
LCAP works as follows:
1. A reader selects a random number r and sends a
Query and r to the tag.
2. The tag computes HaID = h(ID) and h(ID||r) using r
and its ID and sends hL(ID||r) and HaID to the reader,
where hL(ID||r) is the left half of h(ID||r).
3. The reader sends hL(ID||r), r, and HaID to the
back-end database.
4. The back-end database then compares if the value of
HaID in Prev is same as the value of HaID received from
the reader. If successful, then the back-end database com-
putes hR(ID||r) using r received from the reader and ID in
Prev, where hR(ID||r) is the right half of h(ID||r). For the
next session, the back-end database computes and stores
HaID = h(ID ⊕ r) and ID = ID ⊕ r in Curr. TD-field of
Prev is filled with current HaID = h(ID ⊕ r). Finally, the
back-end database sends hR(ID||r) to the reader.
5. The reader forwards hR(ID||r) to the tag.
6. The tag checks hR(ID||r). If it matches, the tag
updates its ID to ID ⊕ r.
In LCAP scheme, ID is changed in each authentica-
tion. So, it does not work in ubiquitous environment.
Also mentioned earlier, it cannot overcome the trace-
ability problem.
3.2 OHLCAP approach
OHLCAP uses a static identifier and secrets and is sui-
table for ubiquitous environment. It also uses a one-way
hash function for privacy and security of the tag. OHL-
CAP requires an ID and a hash function h as in LCAP.
Some additional fields are also required. GI is used as a
group index. K is a common secret used in all tags and
S is a tag secret. The protocol computes three messages:
A1 = K ⊕ c, A2 = ID + (GIi ⊕ r ⊕ c) mod (2l-1), and
B = h(ID||(S ⊕ GIi)||(r ⊕ c)). BL and BR are the left and
right half of B, respectively. c is used as a counter and
initialized to an arbitrary value. It is increased every
time a reader sends a query to the tag. The protocol is
shown in Figure 3.
OHLCAP works as follows [16]:
Step 1: A reader selects a random value r and sends a
query with r to a tag.
Step 2: The tag checks a random value r whether it is
all zero value or not.
1. If r value is all zero, the tag sends “stop” message to
the reader and stop the protocol.
2. Otherwise, the tag performs the following
- The tag computes A1 = K ⊕ c, A2 = ID + (GIi ⊕ r ⊕ c)
mod (2l-1),
B = h(ID||(S ⊕ GIi)||(r ⊕ c)) and sends A1, A2 and BR
to the reader, where BR is a right half of B,
- Then, the tag increases the counter c which should
not exceed 2l - 1.
If the counter c exceeds 2l - 1, it is initialized by
initial c.
Step 3. After receiving from the tag,
1. The reader forwards A1, A2, BR and r to the back-
end database.
2. The back-end database computes c/= A1 ⊕ K and
ID/j = A
2 − (GIj ⊕ r + c′) mod (2l − 1) using all group
indices GIj, j Î {1,...,n}
3. The back-end database checks if one of computed
ID/j(∈{1.....n}) is matching to one of the stored IDs in the
back-end database. If this process succeeds, the back-
end database check if the GIj used to compute the ID
/
j
is equal to the group index GIi that contains the match-
ing ID/j .
- If this is successful, the database computes B=h(ID||
(S ⊕ GIi)||(r ⊕ c)) using the matched ID.
- Otherwise, the back-end database stops this process.
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4. Then, the back-end database authenticates the tag
by matching the received value BR.
5. The back-end database sends BL to the reader,
where BL is a left half of B. The reader forwards BL to
the tag.
Step 4. The tag authenticates the reader by comparing
the received value BL.
OHLCAP is an efficient approach in ubiquitous environ-
ment that uses one-way hash function for privacy and
security. However, Ha et al. [17] find its security weakness
and proposes an enhanced OHLCAP (EOHLCAP)
scheme. The authors showed that this protocol is vulner-
able to traceability attack and impersonation attack
because of its special property, namely, cc = cp + 1 for two
successive sessions. The adversary eavesdrops the mes-
sages transmitted between the tag and the reader and




p = K ⊕ cp,
A1c = K ⊕ cc. Afterwards, it computes A = A1p ⊕ A1c = cp
⊕ cc = cp ⊕ (cp + 1) and removes the secret key K in this
equation. In this way, the adversary can trace the tag’s
holder. Similarly, the adversary can implement impersona-
tion attack by selecting special random number rc = rp +
1. If rc ⊕ cc = rp ⊕ cp then the value of Bp is equal to Bc
since B = h(ID||(S ⊕ GIi)||(r ⊕ c)). To overcome the secur-
ity weakness, Ha et al. [17] add a pseudorandom number
generator to generate a random number and removes the
counter in the tag to prevent traceability attack.
4. Our contributions: secure ubiquitous
authentication protocols (SUAP)
OHLCAP is not protected against traceability and imper-
sonation attacks. It requires much storage in the tag side
and database side. EOHLCAP eliminates the privacy pro-
blem in OHLCAP with reduced amount of storages in
the tag side and the database side but it takes many hash
operations to locate the tag in the database [17]. LCAP
Figure 2 The LCAP protocol.
Figure 3 The OHLCAP protocol.
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requires less storage in the tag and reduces search time in
the database but it is not suitable for ubiquitous comput-
ing environment as the ID is updated after each authenti-
cation process. To overcome these problems, three
Secure Ubiquitous Authentication Protocols SUAP1,
SUAP2 and SUAP3 for RFID systems are proposed in
this section. SUAP1 is a simple RFID authentication pro-
tocol that will work in a system where the number of
tags is small. The preliminary version of SUAP1 is pre-
sented in [23]. The final version of SUAP1 is improved
over the preliminary version with privacy and security
enhancement. SUAP2 and SUAP3 are the extension of
SUAP1 and work in a large group-based system where
RFID tags are divided into several groups. These proto-
cols are low-cost and secured based on challenge-
response method using a one-way hash function, hash-
address as a search index. The proposed protocols com-
bine the features of the hash address and hash function
of the LCAP protocol and the ubiquitous property of
OHLCAP protocol and overcome the existing privacy
and security problems in these two schemes. The advan-
tage of hash address is to reduce the search time in the
database. The notations used in the SUAP1, SUAP2 and
SUAP3 protocols are as follows:
Notations
h A one-way hash function, h:{0,1}* ® {0,1}l
ID Tag identifier
GID Group identifier
Had Hash address h(ID)
N Number of tags
n Number of groups
mi Number of tags in the ith group
l The length of an identifier. The value of l is assumed
96 bits.
r1 Random number in {0,1}
l






SUAP1 protocol uses a static identifier and a secret num-
ber, hash functions and two random numbers. The objec-
tive of this protocol is to preserve the ubiquitous property
of the protocol and is suitable for a small number of tags.
In this case a common secret is stored in all the tags. Two
random numbers make the hash response unpredictable
so that it is impossible to perform impersonation and tra-
cing attack by a malicious reader. The system set-up of
SUAP1 protocol is as follows:
System Set-up
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields:
ID: Tag Identifier
x: Common secret number
Reader: Reader does not contain any field.
Back-end database: Back-end database contains the
following fields:
ID: Tag identifier
x: Common secret number
Had: Hash address h(ID)
When a tag enters into the range of a reader, the
reader can initiate the authentication protocol. The pro-
tocol is shown in Figure 4. The steps in the authentica-
tion protocol are as follows:
1. The reader generates a random number r1 and
sends it to the tag.
2. Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another
random number r2.
If r1 or r2 is 0 stop protocol
Otherwise, the tag performs the following computa-
tions
y ← h(ID) + (r1 ⊕ r2)
t = r2 ⊕ x. t is a temporary variable here.
Computes h(ID||r1||r2)
The tag then sends the value of y, t and hL to the
reader.
Where hL is the left half of h(ID||r1||r2)
3. The reader then sends the value of y, t and r1 to the
back-end database.
4. The back-end database will calculate the following.
r2 = t ⊕ x
h(ID) ← y − (r1 ⊕ r2)
h(ID) is the address of the record containing the ID
where Had = h(ID)
Access the address Had
Retrieves the ID from the record
Then the back-end database computes h(ID||r1||r2)
If hL matches, the tag is authenticated
Sends hR to the reader, where hR is the right half of h
(ID||r1||r2)
5. The reader forwards the hR to the tag
6. If the received hR matches, the reader is
authenticated.
The protocol is simple and works for an organization
having small number of tags (i.e. several thousands). Two
random numbers make the response anonymous. The
problem in this simple protocol is that it maintains a
common secret for all the tags in the database. It can be
a problem to manage this secret in a large organization
having different departments. Having only a single secret
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x for all the tags it cannot ensure privacy and security for
a large organization having millions of tags in many
departments.
4.2 SUAP2
To overcome the problem in SUAP1 of having only one
secret for all the tags, SUAP2 maintains groups for the
different departments and different types of products. In
addition to the ID and secrets in the SUAP1, one extra
variable GID is needed in the tag side and the database
side. It represents a group identifier. This is also a secret
number. The database divides the tags into n groups
and the protocol is shown in Figure 5. The only differ-
ence between the SUAP1 and SUAP2 is that SUAP2
maintains the groups of the tags and there is a common
secret for each group. In this case one secret value x is
used for all the tags in a group. It will reduce the tag
search time in the database. This is suitable for the case
where the tags of the same group are not distributed in
various places. It ensures better security but requires
less computation and search times in the database. The
system set-up of SUAP2 protocol is as follows:
System Set-up
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields:
ID: Tag Identifier
x: Secret number for a group
GID: Group identifier
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields.
Back-end database: Back-end database contains the
following fields:
ID: Tag identifier
x: Secret number for a group
Had: Hash address h(ID)
GID: Group identifier
The steps in the authentication protocol are as
follows:
1 .The reader generates a random number r1 and
sends it to the tag.
2 .Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another
random number r2.
if r1 or r2 is 0 stop protocol
Otherwise, the tag performs the following computa-
tions
y ← h(ID) + (r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ GID)
t = r2 ⊕ x
Figure 4 The proposed SUAP1 protocol.
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Computes h(ID||r1 ||r2||GID)
The tag then sends the value of y, t and hL to the
reader.
Where hL is the left half of h(ID||r1||r2||GID)
3. The reader then sends the value of y, t and r1 to the
back-end database.
4. The back-end database calculates the following for
all GIDs
r2 = t ⊕ x
h(ID) ← y − (r1 ⊕ r2 ⊕ GID)
h(ID) is the address of the record containing the ID
where Had = h(ID)
Lookup the address Had
Retrieves the ID from the record
Then the back-end database computes h(ID||r1||r2||
GID)
If hL matches, the tag is authenticated
Sends hRto the reader, where hR is the right half of h
(ID||r1||r2||GID)
5. The reader forwards the hR to the tag
6. If the received hR matches, the reader is
authenticated.
4.3 SUAP3
The SUAP3 enhances the SUAP2 in efficiency by remov-
ing the secret x from the tag and the database. It keeps the
group variable GID in the tag and the database as in
SUAP2. It represents a group identifier and also a secret
number. The database divides the tags into n groups and
the protocol is shown in Figure 6. The only difference
between the SUAP2 and SUAP3 is that SUAP3 does not
use the secret x for the tag and the database. The group-
based structure is used for the searching tags in the data-
base. The privacy will not be hampered due to the elimi-
nation of the secret x as the GID works as an l bits secret
which is also difficult to guess by the adversary. It reduces
the number of searches significantly. Since the hash func-
tion is one-way it still gives the same security protection
Figure 5 The proposed SUAP2 protocol.
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to the ID. The system set-up of SUAP3 protocol is as
follows:
System Set-up
Tag: Each tag contains the following fields:
ID: Tag Identifier
GID: Group identifier
Reader: Reader does not contain any fields.
Back-end database: Back-end database contains the
following fields:
ID: Tag identifier
Had: Hash address h(ID)
GID: Group identifier
The steps in the authentication protocol are as
follows:
1. The reader generates a random number r1 and
sends it to the tag.
2 .Receiving the number r1 the tag generates another
random number r2.
if r1 or r2 is 0 stop protocol
Otherwise, the tag performs the following computa-
tions
t ← GID ⊕ r2
y ¬h(ID) ⊕ (GID+(r1 ⊕ r2))and computes h(ID||r1||
r2||GID)
The tag then sends the value of y, t and hL to the
reader.
Where hL is the left half of h(ID||r1||r2||GID)
3. The reader then sends the value of y, r1 and t to the
back-end database.
4. The back-end database calculates the following for
all GIDs
r2 ← GID ⊕ t
Hadi ← y ⊕ (GID + (r1 ⊕ r2))
Hadi is the address of the record containing the ID
where Hadi = h(ID)
Lookup the address Hadi in the database
Figure 6 The proposed SUAP3 protocol.
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If Hadi = Had for any ID retrieves the ID from the
record
Then the back-end database computes h(ID||r1||r2||
GID)
If hL matches, the tag is authenticated
Sends hR to the reader, where hR is the right half of h
(ID||r1||r2||GID)
5. The reader forwards the hR to the tag
6. If the received hR matches, the reader is
authenticated.
5. Evaluation of the proposed protocols
The protocols are analysed in two ways: first is the privacy
and security analysis and the second one is the efficiency
analysis.
5.1 Privacy and security analysis
The privacy and security of the proposed protocols are
analysed against various threats introduced in Section 2;
information leakage of a tag, location privacy, imperso-
nation and replay attack, DoS attack and traceability.
The privacy and security analysis against the identified
threats is outlined as follows:
• Information leakage: In SUAP1 protocol, the adver-
sary must be authenticated to access any sensitive infor-
mation from a tag. To authenticate the systems an
adversary must know ID, x and r2 to access any informa-
tion from the tag. The SUAP2 protocol has additional
GID secret to make the response more unpredictable.
The SUAP3 uses the GID as a secret instead of x. The
combination of r1 and r2 makes the response y so unpre-
dictable that the adversary can only guess the value of hR




which is negligible for l = 96 or more.
• Location privacy: The responses from the tags are
always changing in every new session. The value of t, y
and hL cannot be linked with any particular tag in
SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3. The protocols ensure loca-
tion privacy by using new values of r1 and r2 each time.
Even if a malicious reader sends the same random value
r1 all the times, a tag transmits the refreshed values that
are refreshed by r2 and secret value x or GID.
• Impersonation and replay attack: The protocols
work in a complete challenge-response fashion by mutual
authentication. When a tag reaches within the range of a
reader, the reader sends queries with a random number
to the tag. An adversary may also request a tag with a
random number. Without knowing ID, hash function,
secret x and random number r2 generated by the tag, the
adversary cannot find the response y. In SUAP2 and
SUAP3, the group identifier GID also makes the response
more unidentifiable. For each session the tag gives a new
value of y that is totally indistinguishable and different
from other sessions. So, impersonation and replay attack
is nearly impossible in practical scenario. Impersonation
and replay attack could be possible if the attacker waits
for a matched response (same hL) from the tag and
replays the hR to authenticate itself. Such repeating hash
response could only be reproduced once in 2l responses
(where the responses are uniformly random in nature) as
the length of the hash response is l.
• DoS: Since the ID and the secret are never changed
in the proposed protocols, if the attacker prevents the
last flow to the tag from the reader it will not cause any
problem of desynchronization.
• Traceability: The schemes SUAP1, SUAP2 and
SUAP3 are fully protected from future forward and
backward traceability. The attacker has no access over
r2, and the combination of r1 and r2 and the hash func-
tion. The responses are always anonymous and the
attacker does not know the value of the ID and the
secret. So the previous, present and future interactions
are all indistinguishable. The attacker cannot identify
the past and future interactions.
5.2 Efficiency analysis
For efficiency analysis the storage, communication and
computation cost of the proposed protocols are compared
with other protocols in Table 1. The storage cost indicates
the storage requirements in the tag, database and the
reader. The communication cost means the length of bits
the tag and the reader send during the authentication pro-
cess. The computation cost is the maximum computations
require in the tag and the database during the execution
of the authentication protocol.
In Table 1, LCAP [12] performs better than other pro-
tocols for almost all criteria but it suffers from traceabil-
ity problem and it is not ubiquitous. The proposed
protocols show better performance because it requires
less tag side and database side storage and gives protec-
tion from all the known attacks. The storage requirement
for the tag and the database are 2l and 3l, respectively, in
SUAP1 and SUAP3, whereas OHLCAP [16] requires 5l
and 4l, respectively. CRAP [15] uses only 1l storage for a
tag but it needs (N/2+1) hash operations which is practi-
cally unsuitable because in ubiquitous environment the
value of N is extremely high and it does not divide the
tags into groups. It requires many hash operations and
hence requires long search time to obtain the tag infor-
mation in the database. Similarly, the EOHLCAP [17]
requires 3l storages in the tag side and 3l storages in the
database side but requires a large number of hash opera-
tions for a group. This is also high for a group having a
large number of tags. The main computation costs in the
tags are the hash operations. OHLCAP requires 1 hash
operations and additional operations A1 which are four
XOR operations in the tag. EOHLCAP also requires 1
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hash operation and additional operations A2 which are
two XOR operations in the tag. The proposed protocols
require two one-way hash operations in each tag. SUAP1
requires additional operations A2 which are two XOR
operations. Both SUAP2 and SUAP3 require additional
operations A3 which are three XOR operations in the tag.
In each protocol, the tag requires one addition operation.
Since both XOR-operation and addition operation are
very simple bit operation, hardware embodiment of these
operations is simpler than one-way hash function. There-
fore, the proposed protocols are suitable to a low-cost
RFID tag systems. ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4 and ε5 are additional
operations other than hash functions in the correspond-
ing databases as shown in Table 1.
6. Simulation expeeriment and evaluation
To validate the proposed protocols, simulation experi-
ments have been conducted. The privacy and security
protections are ensured with the hash functions and ran-
dom numbers. A hash function is a one-way function for
which the possibility of information leakage is negligible
from the hash response. In the simulation experiment l
takes different values, i.e. 16, 32, 64 and 96. However,
many combinations of the hash inputs can give the same
response that can be used by the adversary to imperso-
nate the RFID systems through replay attack. This is the
main reason to conduct the simulation. The objective of
the simulation program is to verify the protection for
impersonation, replay attack and location privacy. It
checks the response y if it recurs more than once for one
tag during the attacks by an adversary in a given number
of attempts. If the same response is generated for any
given random number pair it can be used by the adver-
sary for impersonation and replay attack and the location
privacy of the tag may be broken.
We simulate the impersonation and replay attack
using Monte Carlo simulation method. To replay the
hash value h (hL|| hR) for a particular ID and GID, hash
responses are generated for 1011 times with the same ID
and GID and different set of r1 and r2. The hash value
generated at ith attempt hi is considered vulnerable for
impersonation and replay attack if hi = h. The generated
random sequences for r1 and r2 are tested for uniform
random distribution using chi square test to ensure the
validity of the simulation using Monte Carlo method.
The number of matches found is recorded to generate
the performance results. For a particular data length ten
simulations are executed using different set of random
numbers and the possible impersonation and replay
attacks are observed in the simulation. The averages of
the successful replay attacks are reported in Table 2.
The output of a hash function is the same for the same
random number pair. Some different random number
pairs may also give the same response. The objective is to
ensure unique response for different inputs of random
number pair so that an adversary is unable to use any
response at later stage to access the tag or the reader. We
select one tag and generate a response for two random
numbers as in SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EOHLCAP.
Then the program attempts 1011 times to check that how
many times the same response is generated. This is the
role of an adversary. In each attempt a new response is
generated with a new pair of random number. The aver-
age number of times a similar response generated in
SUAP1, SUAP2, SUAP3 and EOHLCAP are given in
Table 2. The expected number of matches are also
reported in a column to compare the obtained result.
The value of the expected number of matches is calcu-
lated using the analysis of repeating hash response pre-
sented for replay attack in Section 5.1 and it is calculated
as 1011/2l. All the selected protocols show almost similar
results. The number of matches represents the success of
the adversary to attack the tag. The experiment was con-
ducted for 16, 32, 64 and 96 bits of secret value, random
number, ID and hash response. The success of the adver-
sary was found for 16 and 32 bits since many occurrences
of the same response are found. There was no recurrence
of the same response for 64 and 96 bits for the specified
Table 1 Efficiency analysis
Efficiency criteria LCAP CRAP OHLCAP EOHLCAP Proposed protocols
SUAP1 SUAP2 SUAP3
Storage Tag 1l 1l 5l 3l 2l 3l 2l
Reader - - - - - - -
Database 6l 1l 4l 3l 3l 4l 3l
Computation Tag 2h 3h 1h(+A1) 1h(+A2) 2h (+A2) 2h (+A3) 2h (+A3)




+ 1)h 1h+ε1 (
mi + 1
2
)h + ε2 1h+ ε3 1h+ ε4 1h+ ε5
Communication Tag-to-Reader 1.5l 2l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l 2.5l
Reader-to-tag 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l 0.5l
A1,A2,A3, additional XOR and add operations in the tag; ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5, small operations in the database
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number of attempts, i.e. 1011 times. We did not perform
simulation experiments for LCAP, OHLCAP and
YA_TRAP* protocols since these are not protected
against all the privacy threats [16-18]. CRAP is also not
included since it requires many hash operations [16].
The simulation program has been developed using
Turbo C++ compiler and the experiment was conducted
in a desktop computer with 2.93GHz Intel (R) Core 2
Duo Processor, 3.46 GB memory and Windows XP pro-
fessional Operating System.
According to the privacy and security analysis in Sec-
tion 5.1 and the simulation results the summary of the
privacy and security properties are given in Table 3.
The privacy and security properties of the proposed
protocols are compared with five other schemes. The five
schemes were chosen because all of these protocols
involved tag authentication. LCAP involves secret update
but other four protocols CRAP, OHLCAP, EOHLCAP
and YA_TRAP* do not support secret update. Proposed
protocols are more similar to CRAP, OHLCAP, EOHL-
CAP and YA_TRAP* than LCAP since all these protocols
support authentication in ubiquitous computing environ-
ment and do not update the identifier and secret value.
Table 3 shows that the proposed protocols provided pro-
tections from all the identified privacy and security
threats.
7. Conclusion
Three efficient and secure authentication protocols
SUAP1, SUAP2 and SUAP3 are proposed to protect priv-
acy and security for the low-cost RFID system in ubiqui-
tous computing environment. The privacy and security
problems of LCAP and OHLCAP are overcome in these
protocols. SUAP1 is suitable for the organization having
small number of tags. SUAP2 and SUAP3 are suitable for
medium and large organizations having many depart-
ments. All the proposed schemes require only two one-
way hash function operations and avoid large number of
hash computations in the database and hence are very effi-
cient. The tag search time in the database is reduced by
using the hash value as the address of the corresponding
tag. EOHLCAP also overcomes the problem in OHLCAP
and protects the RFID system from most of the attacks
but it requires many complex hash operations. The pro-
posed protocols ensure privacy and security protections
from all the identified threats. The storage requirements
in SUAP1 and SUAP3 are also less than OHLCAP and
EOHLCAP protocols. The comparison shows that the
proposed protocols are both secure and efficient than
other schemes and have practical advantages over them
because these are simple and provide a larger range of
privacy and security protections for low storage and
computations.
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